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ABSTRACT		 This	research	paper	analyzes	the	results	of	a	survey	distributed	to	394	oil	and	gas	executives.	Respondents	were	asked	to	provide	their	outlook	on	commodity	prices,	methodologies	for	estimating	prices,	preference	for	different	valuation	techniques,	and	priority	of	various	capital	structuring	decision	factors.	The	analysis	includes	single	and	multi-variable	regressions	that	demonstrate	correlations	between	different	survey	categories.	The	analysis	suggests	that	price	outlook	is	on	average	higher	than	the	public	futures	market,	but	the	popularities	of	different	price	estimation	methodologies	have	no	correlation	with	outlook	average	price	or	probability	density.	Other	cross-category	findings	of	note	were	the	positive	correlation	between	use	of	hurdle	rate	analysis	and	priority	of	setting	a	target	capital	structure,	the	negative	correlation	between	use	of	IRR/hurdle	analysis	and	priority	of	comparable	company	debt	levels,	the	negative	correlation	between	use	of	NPV	and	priority	of	interest	tax	shields,	and	the	significance	of	our	bankruptcy	cost	multivariate	regression	model.	Keywords:	Oil,	Commodity	Prices,	Capital	Structure			 	
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INTRODUCTION	This	research	project	is	aimed	at	answering	the	question	of	what	change,	if	any,	has	occurred	in	capital	structure	decisions	made	by	oil	and	gas	companies	in	response	to	the	new,	low	commodity	price	environment.	In	late	2014,	OPEC	could	not	come	to	an	agreement	on	a	supply	quota	and	North	American	production	had	drastically	increased	in	response	to	the	fracking	revolution.	The	resulting	oil	glut	caused	prices	to	enter	free	fall,	dropping	from	$107	in	July	of	2014	to	$43	in	March	of	2015.	Many	oil	and	gas	companies	were	unable	to	meet	the	interest	rate	or	Debt/EBITDA	covenants	of	their	loan	agreements,	causing	a	large	portion	of	the	industry	to	seek	refinancing	opportunities	in	2015.	As	equity	prices	fell	dramatically,	banks	were	simultaneously	cautioned	to	avoid	the	systemic	risk	of	the	oil	and	gas	sector,	which	effectively	closed	off	equity	and	low-yield	debt	markets	to	most	companies.	Thus,	managers	were	forced	to	adopt	new	capital	structures	and	pursue	creative	methods	of	financing	capital	expenditures.		In	2016,	prices	began	to	stabilize	and	firms	were	able	to	lock	in	new	hedges	that	would	support	a	return	to	the	capital	markets.	For	firms	that	survived	the	crisis,	this	period	has	presented	opportunities	for	aggressive	acquisition	strategies	that	are	fueled	by	a	low	cost	of	debt	and	a	need	for	consolidation	in	the	highly	fragmented	industry.	Many	executives	are	currently	deciding	how	to	size	their	leverage	in	the	wake	of	the	price	collapse;	is	the	bad	taste	of	the	collapse	going	to	promote	caution	or	will	the	possibilities	of	a	rebound	in	conjunction	with	low	interest	rates	create	a	higher	affinity	for	debt.	These	trends	are	the	core	focus	of	the	research	question	and	will	require	an	analysis	of	the	commodity	price	outlook	and	an	in	depth	look	at	the	oil	and	gas	executive’s	capital	structuring	process.	
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SIGNIFICANCE	Over	100	bankruptcies	have	been	declared	in	the	oil	and	gas	industry	over	the	last	two	years,	and	substantially	more	firms	have	had	to	seek	refinancing	opportunities	in	the	wake	of	the	commodity	price	slide.	Yet,	some	firms	survived	the	collapse	and	were	able	to	continue	servicing	their	debt	by	de-levering	to	avoid	breach	of	EBITDA/reserve-based	covenants.	For	oil	executives	and	academics	both,	the	question	of	why	some	firms	had	seemingly	less	than	optimal	(or,	in	hindsight,	why	some	firms	had	more	than	manageable)	amounts	of	debt	on	their	books	is	very	significant.	This	industry	is	very	cyclical,	and	the	global	commodity	boom-bust	cycle	will	very	likely	take	a	turn	for	the	worse	again	some	time	in	the	next	decade	or	two.	Thus,	it	is	extremely	important	to	understand	the	decision	making	process	that	survivor	firms	went	through	prior	to	the	collapse.			 Moreover,	this	research	is	applicable	to	similar	commodity	driven	industries	that	have	sizeable	effects	on	the	U.S.	economy,	especially	steal	and	coal.	The	coal	industry	in	particular	can	draw	many	parallels,	though	the	commodity	price	collapse	in	that	industry	was	caused	by	a	sudden	cut	in	forecasted	demand	after	the	Clean	Power	Plan	and	subsequent	Paris	climate	agreement.		
METHODOLOGY	
Design		 The	survey	focuses	on	three	areas:	price	outlook,	project	valuation	methodology,	and	capital	structuring.	We	developed	a	survey	based	on	the	one	administered	by	John	Graham	and	Campbell	Harvey	in	1999	(“Graham	&	Harvey	study”),	which	was	industry	
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generic.	Our	survey	was	tailored	to	the	oil	and	gas	industry	by	including	additional	questions	that	focused	on	the	role	commodity	prices	play	in	corporate	financial	planning.		 The	final	version	of	the	survey	included	eleven	questions	and	took	on	average	ten	minutes	to	complete.	The	first	section	collected	demographic	information	about	the	firm.	Subsequent	sections	required	respondents	to	provide	their	price	outlook,	agree	or	disagree	with	various	price	prediction	methodologies,	estimate	the	usage	frequency	of	various	project	valuation	methodologies	and	rank	the	importance	of	various	factors	when	considering	an	appropriate	capital	structure.		 Our	recipient	pool	was	made	up	of	394	executives	with	decision-making	roles	at	239	different	oil	and	gas	firms	within	the	U.S.	and	Canada.	These	included	CEOs,	CFOs	and	Business	Development	executives	of	varying	tenures	at	their	respective	companies.			
Delivery	and	Response		 The	survey	was	delivered	electronically	via	email	using	the	Wharton	Qualtrics	system	(“Qualtrics”),	which	assigns	a	unique	link	to	each	recipient	for	tracking	purposes.	The	survey	was	sent	to	a	21-person	trial	group	on	February	9,	2017	to	determine	if	the	delivery	mechanism	was	working	properly	and	identify	any	potential	errors	in	the	survey	design.	After	we	received	one	successful	response	from	this	group,	we	were	prepared	to	deliver	the	survey	to	the	main	group.	The	remaining	373	recipients	were	emailed	the	survey	on	February	21,	2017.	One	week	later,	on	February	28,	2017,	a	reminder	email	was	sent	to	those	who	had	not	yet	completed	the	survey.			 Fifty-six	recipients	started	the	survey,	and	thirty-five	completed	surveys	were	ultimately	returned,	for	a	response	rate	of	slightly	less	than	9%.	This	compares	favorably	to	
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the	Graham	&	Harvey	study,	which	attained	a	9%	response	rate	when	surveying	4,440	firms	in	1999.	Unlike	that	survey,	which	was	a	part	of	the	quarterly	mailings	regularly	distributed	by	the	Financial	Executives	Institute	(FEI),	our	email	was	a	one-time	request	for	information	with	no	prior	interaction.		
PRICE	BUCKETING	
Design		 Respondents	were	given	15	potential	price	outcome	buckets,	which	started	at	<$15	and	incremented	up	in	$5	sections	to	>$80	(i.e.	<$15,	$15-20…$75-80,	>$80).	They	were	asked	to	provide	a	percent	probability	that	the	January	2018	WTI	contract	would	close	within	each	bucket,	such	that	the	sum	of	all	the	buckets	would	be	equivalent	to	100%.		
	
Results	
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I.	Aggregate	Price	Outlook	
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Aggregate	probabilities	were	created	by	averaging	these	percentages	across	all	thirty-five	respondents.	The	summary	results	below	indicate	a	strong	inclination	toward	the	contract’s	going	price	as	of	the	survey’s	distribution	-	$54-55.	It	is	clear	that	firms	are	generally	neutral	or	optimistic	when	viewing	market	data	regarding	future	prices.			 The	analysis	was	also	able	to	estimate	an	individual	respondent’s	“composite	price”	by	multiplying	the	midpoint	of	each	bucket	by	the	probability	of	its	occurrence	and	then	summing	these	probability-adjusted	values.	Composite	prices	ranged	from	$46.25	to	$62.50	and	had	a	standard	deviation	of	$3.96.		 The	analysis	measured	density	within	buckets	as	a	metric	of	what	firm	executives	believed	regarding	price	volatility	going	forward.	To	do	this,	this	study	took	the	average	of	all	non-zero	bucket	probabilities	within	an	individual	respondent’s	set.	The	average	density	was	20.17%,	ranging	from	8.33%	to	50%	with	a	standard	deviation	of	7.75%.	From	this	information	one	can	conclude	that	the	firm	executives	have	a	general	consensus	regarding	price,	but	are	significantly	less	homogenous	in	their	views	regarding	volatility.	An	underlying	variable	that	skews	this	would	be	the	time	taken	to	think	about	and	answer	this	question.	Respondents	that	took	more	time	would	be	more	precise	in	addressing	the	probability	of	fringe	cases,	and	thus	have	a	lower	density.	Unfortunately	Qualtrics	does	not	provide	data	regarding	the	time	to	complete	an	individual	question,	only	the	entire	survey,	so	we	will	not	be	able	to	determine	if	the	spread	in	density	can	be	attributed	to	inconsistent	views	regarding	volatility	or	time	spent	developing	a	probability	spread.				
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PRICE	ESTIMATION	RATIONALE	
Design	This	study	also	sought	to	gain	perspective	on	how	firm	executives	typically	develop	their	price	outlooks	and	whether	or	not	these	different	methodologies	can	significantly	predict	discrepancies	in	composite	price	or	average	density.		 Respondents	were	asked	to	rate	five	different	statements	regarding	forward	price	estimation	on	a	six-point	scale	from	“Strongly	Disagree”	(1)	to	“Strongly	Agree”	(6).	The	statements	were:		
l “Prices	are	too	volatile	to	estimate	going	forward”	
l “Commodity	futures	curves	are	a	good	estimate	of	what	actual	future	prices	will	be”	
l “Historical	price	volatility	can	be	helpful	in	predicting	future	prices”	
l “Research	reports	regarding	future	macroeconomic	factors	(supply,	demand	etc.)	are	valuable	to	price	predictions”	
l “The	price	of	call	options	and	other	hedging	instruments	can	be	used	to	improve	estimates	of	future	volatility”		The	study	included	these	statements	to	determine	the	complexity	of	analysis	different	executives	employ	when	estimating	prices.	For	example,	reverse	solving	for	implied	future	volatility	given	the	details	of	a	call	option	is	a	more	complex	technique	that	would	be	rarely	employed.	In	contrast,	it	was	believed	that	many	executives	would	anchor	their	estimates	to	the	commodity	futures	curve	because	they	can	hedge	at	that	level.	
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Results	
	Average	responses	ranged	from	3.1	(Slightly	Disagree)	to	4.8	(Agree)	with	little	to	no	difference	in	standard	deviation,	which	was	between	1.3	and	1.45	for	all	of	the	statements.	Respondents	on	average	slightly	disagreed	that	commodity	futures	curves	are	a	good	estimate	of	what	actual	prices	will	be	(3.1).	This	is	very	interesting,	as	the	average	composite	price	was	in	such	close	proximity	to	the	current	futures	curve.	Thus,	despite	executives	on	average	disagreeing	with	the	accuracy	of	the	curve	their	quantitative	responses	are	in	strong	alignment.	Executives	were,	on	average,	most	in	favor	of	research	reports	regarding	macroeconomic	factors	(4.8).	The	second	most	agreed	on	statement	was	that	future	commodity	prices	are	too	volatile	to	predict	(4.3).	Perhaps	this	general	sentiment	explains	why	executives	tend	to	fall	back	on	the	futures	curve	regardless	of	the	fact	that	they	disagree	with	its	usefulness	in	developing	a	price	outlook.		
3.1	
3.9	
4.1	
4.3	
4.8	
1.0	 2.0	 3.0	 4.0	 5.0	 6.0	
Commodity	futures	curves	are	a	good	estimate	of	what	actual	future	prices	will	be	
Historical	price	volatility	can	be	helpful	in	predicting	future	prices	
The	price	of	call	options	and	other	hedging	instruments	can	be	used	to	improve	estimates	of	
Prices	are	too	volatile	to	estimate	going	forward	
Research	reports	regarding	future	macroeconomic	factors	(supply,	demand	etc.)	are	
II.	Viability	of	Price	Estimation	
1	=	Strongly	Disagree	6	=	Strongly	Agree	
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After	examining	these	summary	statistics	the	study	used	regression	models	to	analyze	the	correlation	between	price	estimation	methodologies	and	the	price	bucketing	results.	This	research	found	that	the	agree-disagree	rating	on	the	methodology	statements	were	correlated	with	neither	their	composite	price	nor	their	bucket	density	(see	Exhibit	1).		Only	one	correlation	had	a	p-level	below	0.1:	the	negative	relationship	between	bucket	density	and	“Historical	price	volatility	can	be	helpful	in	predicting	future	prices”.	Respondents	that	believed	historical	volatility	could	be	helpful	tended	to	have	a	tighter	spread	in	their	buckets.	This	suggests	that	a	subset	of	the	respondents	may	predict	lower	volatility	in	the	future	price	landscape,	in	part,	because	of	high	volatility	in	the	year	prior	to	the	survey.		
VALUATION	METHODOLOGY	
Design	Similar	to	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study,	this	section	focuses	on	how	oil	and	gas	firms	value	potential	projects.	The	survey	asked	company	executives	about	the	traditional	methods	of	valuation	like	IRR	and	NPV,	as	well	as	the	less	commonly	used	methods	–	adjusted	present	value,	payback	period,	discounted	payback	period,	profitability	index,	and	accounting	rate	of	return.	Following	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study,	the	survey	also	included	an	earnings	multiple	approach,	simulation	analysis,	value	at	risk,	and	the	value	of	real	options	embedded	in	the	project.	In	addition	to	the	methodologies	included	in	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study,	the	survey	included	a	hurdle	rate	analysis.	Background	research	indicated	that	private	equity	firms	commonly	use	this	method	to	determine	if	an	investment	will	meet	the	needs	of	its	portfolio	and	investors.		
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Respondents	are	asked	to	rate	each	method	based	on	how	frequently	they	employ	it	when	valuing	a	project.	The	methods	are	rated	from	1	to	4	(1	meaning	“never”,	4	meaning	“always”).	Similar	to	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study,	these	responses	represent	beliefs.	The	survey	has	no	way	of	verifying	that	these	responses	coincide	with	actions.		
Results	
	Similar	to	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study	and	in	accordance	with	our	hypothesis,	NPV	(3.91)	and	IRR	(3.88)	are	the	highest	rated	methods.	Gitman	and	Forrester	(1977)	states	that	only	9.8%	of	firms	use	NPV	analysis	in	comparison	to	the	53.6%	that	value	projects	using	IRR,	while	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study	found	the	two	methods	to	be	almost	identically	rated.	NPV	is	the	primary	valuation	method	for	oil	and	gas	projects	because	of	the	prevalence	of	net	asset	valuation	when	valuing	an	oil	and	gas	company	at	the	corporate	level.		
1.00	 2.00	 3.00	 4.00	Accounting	Rate	of	Return		
Value-at-risk	or	other	Simulation	Analysis	
Incorporate	the	"real	options"	of	a	project	
Discounted	Payback	Period	
ProVitability	Index	
Earnings	Multiple	Approach	
Adjusted	Present	Value	
Sensitivity	Analysis	(e.g.	"good"	vs.	"fair"	vs.	
Hurdle	Rate	
Payback	Period	
Internal	Rate	of	Return	
Net	Present	Value	
III.	Usage	of	Selected	Project	Valuation	Methodologies	
1	=	Never	Use	4	=	Always	Use	
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Outside	of	these	two	methods,	the	next	most	popular	valuation	technique	is	the	payback	period	(3.16).	The	Graham	&	Harvey	study	found	a	similar	result	and	was	surprised	because	this	method	fails	to	incorporate	the	time	value	of	money	or	cash	flows	after	the	payback	threshold.		Hurdle	rate	was	the	fourth	most	popular	analysis	used	by	executives.	It	was	surprising	to	find	that	this	technique	was	also	not	significantly	correlated	with	a	firm	being	publicly	traded.	Since	hurdle	rates	can	stem	from	a	variety	of	rationales,	the	survey	asked	respondents	that	employ	a	hurdle	rate	analysis	to	provide	the	origin	or	reasoning	behind	their	selected	hurdle	rate.	Many	firms	indicated	that	their	private	equity	sponsor	established	the	hurdle	rate	at	the	time	of	the	company’s	formation,	while	one	executive	noted	that	this	method	is	used	particularly	when	in	negotiations	with	a	private	equity	firm.	Other	executives	based	their	hurdle	rate	on	cost	of	capital,	specifically,	“IRR	is	compared	against	cost	of	capital	and	used	to	rank	different	projects.”	One	executive	provided	a	more	complex	hurdle	rate	by	stating	that	the	firm	tests	for	a	minimum	10%	IRR	when	WTI	is	at	$40.		 Only	one	valuation	methodology	was	significantly	correlated	with	a	firm’s	publicly	traded	status:	earnings	multiple	approach.	Publicly	traded	firms	were	found	to	be	significantly	less	likely	to	use	the	earnings	multiple	approach	to	value	projects	compared	to	private	firms.	This	was	also	surprising,	as	the	initial	hypothesis	was	that	public	firms	would	be	more	concerned	with	peer-relative	metrics.	Public	equity	holders	typically	have	options	between	competitive	firms	and	should	make	decisions	based	on	the	relative	strength	of	a	company’s	asset	portfolio.	Private	firms	may	be	more	likely	to	use	an	earnings	multiple	approach	because	they	have	more	volatile	projects	that	will	produce	difficult	to	estimate	
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cash	flows.	Thus,	an	earnings	multiple	approach	that	bypasses	long	term	cash	flow	estimation	may	provide	them	with	a	better	indication	of	a	project’s	value	were	it	to	be	sold	to	a	large	strategic.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	even	in	random	data	sets	correlations	will	be	present,	so	this	hypothetical	explanation	is	not	necessarily	evidence	for	a	true	difference	between	public	and	private	firms.	
	
CAPITAL	STRUCTURING	
Design	This	section	was	the	main	focus	of	our	survey,	in	which	we	asked	respondents	to	rank	order	the	most	important	factors	contributing	to	their	capital	structuring	decisions.	Factors	would	be	given	rankings	from	1	to	11.	The	responses	are	the	beliefs	of	the	executives	and	the	actual	capital	structures	may	not	reflect	the	same	priorities.	The	survey	presented	the	following	factors:	
l Interest	expense	deduction	for	tax	purposes	
l The	costs	of	bankruptcy	or	financial	distress	
l Your	firm’s	target	capital	structure	
l Credit	rating	
l Financial	flexibility	
l Previous	quarter	commodity	price	volatility	
l Commodity	price	futures	curve	
l Interest	rate	and	inflation	risk	
l Market	signaling	of	debt	sizing	(equity	price	response)	
l Equity	market	availability	
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l Debt	levels	of	comparable	competitors		In	traditional	trade-off	theory,	the	benefit	of	additional	leverage	is	the	tax	savings	from	interest,	while	the	cost	is	financial	distress	and	the	potential	of	bankruptcy		(Modigliani	&	Miller	1958,	Miller	1977).	Similar	to	the	Graham	&	Harvey	study	the	survey	included	more	complex	factors	in	the	trade-off	calculation,	but	it	also	incorporated	oil	and	gas	specific	factors.	Graham	&	Harvey	differ	from	this	survey	as	they	used	a	scale	rating,	but	this	study	focuses	more	on	relative	priority	of	the	different	factors	as	opposed	to	usage	frequency.	
Results	
	Financial	flexibility	(2.0)	was	the	clear	leading	factor	when	determining	how	much	debt	is	appropriate	for	the	firm.	It	would	be	interesting	to	continue	distributing	this	survey	year	over	year	to	see	if	flexibility	becomes	less	important	as	cash	flows	in	the	oil	and	gas	
8.1	7.7	
7.6	6.9	
6.8	6.5	
6.3	5.8	
5.3	3.2	
2.0	
1.0	 3.0	 5.0	 7.0	 9.0	 11.0	Debt	levels	of	comparable	competitors	
Previous	quarter	commodity	price	volatility	Interest	expense	deduction	for	tax	purposes	
The	costs	of	bankruptcy	or	pinancial	distress	Market	signaling	of	debt	sizing	(equity	price	
Interest	rate	and	inplation	risk	Equity	market	availability	
Credit	rating	Commodity	price	futures	curve	
Your	pirm's	target	capital	structure	ratio	Financial	plexibility	
IV.	Importance	of	Selected	Factors	When	Determing	
Debt	Levels	
1	=	Most	Important	11	=	Least	Important	
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industry	increase	to	pre-crisis	levels.	It	was	surprising	that	flexibility	was	rated	so	highly,	but	the	cost	of	bankruptcy	(6.9)	was	of	significantly	lower	importance	to	executives.	Despite	the	number	of	bankruptcies	in	North	America	over	the	last	two	years,	equity	market	availability	(6.3)	and	interest	rate/inflation	risk	(6.5)	had	higher	rankings.	Commodity	futures	curve	(5.3)	was	ranked	highly	as	well.	This	may	be	because	the	futures	curve	not	only	estimates	future	EBITDA	for	the	purpose	of	debt	serviceability,	but	also	provides	the	outlook	at	which	firms	can	hedge	and	effectively	lock	in	a	risk	profile.		
CROSS-CATEGORY	ANALYSIS		 One	of	the	first	cross-category	relationships	this	study	looked	at	was	the	correlation	between	popularity	of	individual	valuation	methodologies	and	importance	of	individual	capital	structure	factors.	The	analysis	included	a	single	variable	regression	for	each	possible	pair	of	responses	(one	valuation	methodology	with	one	capital	structure	factor)	and	reviewed	the	132	results	to	determine	which	relationships	were	statistically	significant	(See	Exhibit	1).		 The	first	significant	relationship	to	highlight	is	the	increased	likelihood	of	firms	that	use	a	hurdle	rate	when	valuing	projects	to	set	a	target	capital	structure	for	their	firm.	Hurdle	rate	analysis	is	popular	amongst	privately	sponsored	E&P’s,	which	are	usually	provided	with	strict	guidelines	regarding	appropriate	leverage	levels.	Moreover,	firms	with	target	capital	structures	typically	maintain	a	tighter	cost	of	capital	range,	allowing	them	to	more	consistently	incorporate	a	return	threshold	in	their	analysis.			 In	addition,	firms	that	always	use	a	hurdle	rate	or	IRR	analysis	to	value	projects	are	significantly	less	likely	to	incorporate	the	debt	levels	of	competitors	in	their	analysis.	
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Specifically	in	the	oil	and	gas	space,	we	believe	that	firms	are	more	focused	on	generating	competitive	asset-level	returns	in	their	portfolio	and	less	focused	on	corporate-level	peer	comparison.	As	a	result,	the	study	suggests	that	E&P	firms	use	financing	strategically	to	find	the	best	projects	as	opposed	to	aligning	their	risk	profile	with	the	industry	average.		 Another	trend	the	analysis	discovered	was	that	firms	using	the	accounting	or	book	rate	of	return	on	investment	were	more	likely	to	incorporate	previous	quarter	price	volatility	and	the	futures	curve	in	their	capital	structuring	decisions.	This	method	of	valuation	is	rarely	used,	but	it	may	be	a	useful	tool	for	firms	that	wish	to	demonstrate	financial	strength	to	their	investors	via	public	filings.	Thus,	aligning	their	capital	structure	to	reflect	historical	(last-quarter	or	last-year)	stability	would	require	a	review	of	historical	prices.	Accounting	return	also	includes	the	value	of	hedges,	which	are	marked	to	market	using	the	futures	curve.	Moreover,	the	futures	curve	also	determines	the	value	of	a	firm’s	reserves	and	thus	their	available	borrowing	capacity.	Ultimately,	the	analysis	suggests	that	this	trend	is	representative	of	firms	that	are	concerned	with	the	outward	appearance	of	their	financial	health.		 One	of	the	trends	that	refuted	traditional	financial	theory	was	that	NPV-focused	firms	were	significantly	less	likely	to	incorporate	interest	rate,	inflation	risk,	or	interest	tax	shields	into	their	capital	structuring	decisions.	Prior	to	this	analysis,	it	was	thought	that	executives	would	heavily	analyze	the	discount	rate	and	value	of	tax	savings	in	a	net	present	valuation	and	that	the	importance	of	this	analysis	would	have	residual	effects	on	the	priority	of	those	components	when	determining	capital	structure.	In	contrast,	this	result	suggests	that	the	discount	rate	and	tax	shields	are	not	relevant	in	valuing	projects;	rather,	firms	use	a	fixed	discount	rate	and	assume	no	tax	shields	to	simply	rate	projects	relative	to	
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one	another.	This	discovery	exemplifies	the	concept	that	financial	practice	differs	greatly	from	the	academic	theory	and	textbook	methods.	The	next	and	most	anticipated	relationship	this	study	examined	was	how	price	outlook	affects	the	importance	of	the	capital	structuring	decision	factors.	The	analysis	included	a	regression	model	that	took	in	multiple	price	outlook	data	points	and	tested	the	model	on	each	dependent	capital	structuring	variable.	Ultimately,	the	analysis	found	that	the	model	with	the	highest	predicting	power	included	Composite	Price,	“High	View”,	“Low	View”,	“Tail	10”	and	Private	vs.	Public.	The	analysis	found	this	model	to	be	most	effective	at	predicting	the	importance	of	bankruptcy	cost	in	a	firm’s	capital	structuring	decisions	(See	Exhibit	2).		 Composite	price	is	the	sum	product	of	the	probability	weightings	and	the	midpoint	of	their	respective	price	buckets.	High	View	is	the	probability	a	firm	executive	assigned	to	prices	above	$60.	Low	View	is	the	probability	a	firm	executive	assigned	to	prices	below	$40.	Firms	designated	a	10%	probability	of	prices	falling	below	the	level	represented	by	Tail	(in	this	case	10).	Public	vs.	Private	was	represented	by	a	binary	variable.			 It	was	initially	surprising	to	find	that	firms	were	more	likely	to	rank	the	cost	of	bankruptcy	highly	if	their	outlook	had	a	high	composite	price.	The	starting	hypothesis	was	that	firms	with	a	lower	price	outlook	would	foresee	a	greater	chance	of	bankruptcy	and	thus	prioritize	those	costs	when	selecting	a	capital	structure.	However,	this	analysis	indicates	that	those	firms	with	a	low	price	outlook	may	actually	be	more	prepared	for	a	downturn	(due	to	hedges	or	operational	diversity)	and	thus	not	prioritize	bankruptcy	because	they	believe	they	will	be	able	to	weather	a	price	drop.		
	 18	
	 In	contrast,	firms	that	presented	an	outlook	with	a	high	probability	of	prices	surpassing	$60	were	less	likely	to	rank	bankruptcy	costs	as	a	priority.	This	fits	better	with	the	initial	hypothesis	and	suggests	that	firms	will	ascribe	little	to	no	likelihood	of	bankruptcy	if	they	believe	prices	have	strong	upside	potential.	Interestingly,	the	Low	View	variable	has	substantially	less	explanatory	power.		 	
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